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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880346-CA 
v. : 
DANNY L. PIERCE, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of presenting a false 
or fraudulent insurance claim in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-521 (1978), following a trial in Fourth District Court, in 
and for Utah County, State of Utah, Boyd L. Park, Judge, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the information was sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Utah law and need not have plead specific facts 
to establish that the prosecution was within the statute of 
limitations. 
2. Whether the issue concerning the statute of 
limitations was a question of law to be determined by the trial 
court or a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
3. Whether the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense, which requires the defendant to come forward 
with some evidence to support his claim that the statute has run. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Danny L. Pierce, was charged with presenting 
a false or fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-521 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury in Fourth 
District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, on February 24, 
1988. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. Execution of the 
sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for 
18 months. The terms of probation included, inter alia, that he 
pay restitution in the amount of $ 6,450, that he pay a fine in 
the amount of $750 or complete 150 hours of community service, 
that he pay $187 to the victim's reparation fund, and that he 
serve 30 days in the Utah County jail. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Prior to July 14, 1981, defendant made an appointment 
with Darwin Cottle, an independent insurance agent, to discuss 
obtaining insurance for his 1977 four-wheel drive Chevrolet 
pickup truck (R. 267). Defendant and Mr. Cottle met once, and 
then on July 14, 1981, defendant returned for a second meeting 
(R. 269). Defendant emphasized that the vehicle was of great 
value to him, that he took good care of it, and he wanted to make 
sure it was insured for at least $8,000 (R. 268-69). On July 14, 
at defendant's request, Mr. Cottle filled out an application for 
insurance and issued a binder (R. 270). The insurance coverage 
took effect the same day (R. 273). 
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On July 19, 1981, only five days later, defendant 
contacted Mr. Cottle to inform him that the vehicle had been 
stolen (R. 278). On July 21, 1981, defendant gave Mr. Cottle 
additional information over the phone and Mr. Cottle completed an 
accident/loss report (R. 280). 
Ned Walker, a claims adjuster, was assigned to handle 
the claim (R. 292). He met with defendant and obtained his 
handwritten statement (R. 297). Defendant signed the statement 
in Mr. Walker's presence (R. 302). Defendant informed Mr. Walker 
that Russell Hunsaker and Warren Booth had taken the truck to a 
movie at University Mall in Orem and that when they got out of 
the movie they discovered that the truck was missing (R. 299). 
As part of his investigation, Mr. Walker discussed the matter 
with Hunsaker and Booth (R. 299). Defendant was paid $8,000 for 
the loss, less $100 for the deductible provision (R. 300). The 
actual loss to the insurance company, after salvage of part of 
the truck, was $6,450 (R. 300). 
Defendant's truck had not been stolen, as he claimed. 
Defendant was in financial trouble and needed money (R. 314, 
325). He contrived a plan to strip the vehicle, push it over a 
cliff in Provo Canyon, and then collect the insurance money (R. 
324-29). 
Defendant made arrangements with Russell Hunsaker to 
take the stripped truck up Provo Canyon and push it over a cliff 
(R. 322-23). Hunsaker had been a friend and employee of 
defendant for a number of years, having met defendant when he was 
14 (R. 311, 313). Hunsaker was working for defendant in July 
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1981; defendant was frequently late in paying Hunsaker and 
eventually Hunsaker left his employment (R. 314-15). Hunsaker 
and Warren Booth, who both testified at trial, along with two 
other individuals, took the truck to a location in Provo Canyon, 
removed the wheels and tires, and then pushed the truck over a 
cliff (R. 323, 370-72). The truck had been stripped of its seat, 
windows, roll bar, stereo and other items prior to taking it up 
the canyon (R. 322, 371). Hunsaker and Booth then returned to 
defendant's home and, as defendant had instructed them, called 
the police (R. 317-19, 368-69). They told the investigating 
officer that they had gone to a movie at University Mall and, 
upon returning to the location of the truck, found that it had 
been stolen (R. 317). 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss, 
contending that the statute of limitations barred prosecution for 
the offense (R. 14). In support of his motion, defendant called 
six witnesses (R. 147, 187, 195, 203, 220, 246). He attempted to 
show that authorities had discovered the offense prior to the 
time Russell Hunsaker then came forward in June 1987. However, 
defendant was unable to establish that the police had more than a 
mere hunch or suspicion that defendant had fraudulently presented 
the insurance claim. 
Specifically, Bruce Wilkins, Orem Police Department, 
suspected insurance fraud, in view of the policy having been in 
effect less than a week, but he had no evidence that defendant 
was responsible (R. 150-53). Officer McComber took the initial 
report and based on his prior association with defendant, he was 
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suspicious but had no evidence (R. 190). Darren Cottle, the 
insurance agent, had a "gut feeling" that something was amiss, 
but had no information to establish fraud (R. 197). Ned Walker, 
the insurance adjuster, had a "normal apprehension" about the 
claim, but had no proof of fraud (R. 209-10). Paul Johnson, the 
Orem City Attorney, received information from defendant's wife, 
Jodi Pierce, in May of 1986 that defendant had engaged in general 
criminal activity, but was given no information concerning an 
alleged theft in 1981 (R. 221-22). And, finally, Charlotte 
Leany, who was with Jodi Pierce when she talked to Paul Johnson, 
reiterated that Mrs. Pierce had not told Johnson about the 
insurance fraud (R. 248). 
Defendant's involvement in the "theft" of his truck was 
not discovered until June 4, 1987, when Russell Hunsaker, 
defendant's friend and former employee, informed Paul Johnson, 
the Orem City Attorney, about defendant's scheme. During a 
deposition for an unrelated civil matter, Hunsaker stated that 
he, Warren Booth, and others took the stripped vehicle to Provo 
Canyon and "dumped" it at the request of defendant. Warren 
Booth's deposition was taken on August 5, 1987, and he reiterated 
the statements of Hunsaker (R. 32-34; see also R. 167, 172-73, 
182). 
Following the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, 
the trial court denied the motion (R. 251). Following the trial, 
This evidence was not elicited during the hearing on the 
pretrial motion, but was put before the trial court in the 
State's response to defendant's motion to dismiss, which was 
signed by the deputy county attorney (R. 32-38). 
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defendant was convicted as charged of presenting a false or 
fraudulent insurance claim (R. 84). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The information charging defendant with presenting a 
false or fraudulent insurance claim need not have plead facts 
that would establish that the statute of limitations had not run. 
Under Utah law, an information can be an extremely summary 
statement of the charge. It need not allege such things as time 
and may or may not contain a probable cause statement. So long 
as the information provides defendant with notice of the charge, 
it is legally sufficient. In any event, the information charged 
defendant with -fraud," which would have put him on notice that 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-303 (Supp. 1987) would be applicable, which 
makes the statute of limitations for crimes involving fraud a 
potential seven years so long as the prosecution is commenced 
within one year of discovery of the offense. 
Whether the statute of limitations had expired was a 
question of law for the trial court; as such, defendant's 
requested jury instructions on this issue were properly denied. 
The State of Utah had the burden of proving each 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; the burden of 
proof was not improperly shifted to defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTION NEED NOT PLEAD FACTS IN THE 
INFORMATION TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CRIME WAS 
COMMITTED WITHIN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Defendant was charged with presenting a false or 
fraudulent insurance claim, which was a second degree felony 
because of the $8,000 value of the claim A prosecution for a 
felony must generally be commenced within four years of the 
completion of the offense. Utah Code Ann, § 7 6-1-302(1)(a) 
(S upp. 1987). H owe\ e i: , wh e i I a ma t e i: i a 1! e 1 erne n t o £ t h e offense 
includes fraud, the prosecution can be commenced within one year 
after the "discovery of the offense" so long as the prosecution 
i s i lot exterided moire thai i tl u: ee year s beyond the usua] four year 
period. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-303(a) (Supp. 1987). In the 
present case, defendant committed the crime on or about July 19, 
1981 (R 2761). The offense was not discovered until defendant's 
accomplice, Russell Hunsaker, came forward with information about 
the crime in June 1987 (R. 32-34). The information commencing 
the action was filed on November 19, 1987 (R 1 0 ) , which tolled 
the running of the statute of limitations. State v. Strand, 674 
P.2d 109/ 110 (Utah 1983). Because the proserutioTi wa?- commenced 
within one year after discovery of the offense, the usual four 
year statute was extended to seven years. 
Defendant argues that the infoimation waw detective in 
that it fai ] ed to plead specific facts tc: » establish that the 
statute of limitations did not bar the prosecution of the 
offense. In si ippox t of thi s argumentil( de£endant ci tes In re 
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Demillo, 121 Cal.Rptr. 725, 14 Cal.3d. 598, 535 P.2d 1181 (1975). 
However, as set-forth below, this 13-year-old California case is 
not in accord with Utah law. 
Utah has adopted a form of notice pleading. The 
requirements for an information are contained in Utah R. Crim. P. 
4(b), which states: 
An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating in concise terms the definition of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. An information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership 
need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, 
statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are 
generally known or by which they may be 
identified without setting forth a copy. 
However, details concerning such things may 
be obtained through a bill of particulars. 
Neither presumptions of law nor matters of 
judicial notice need be stated. 
The purpose of an information is to charge an offense 
and sufficiently apprise a defendant of the particulars of the 
charge to enable the defendant to "adequately prepare his 
defense." State v. Fultonf 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Utah 1987), 
cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 777 (1988), citing, State v. Burnett, 
712 P.2d 260, 266 (Utah 1985); McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 
326 (Utah 1983). As the Supreme Court also noted in Fulton, the 
contents of an information may be an extremely summairy statement 
of the charge. Id. Neither Rule 4(b) nor Utah caselaw requires 
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that an information plead specific facts to establish that the 
crime was. irummenced within the applicable statute of limitations. 
Defendant's reliance on In re Demillo is not 
persuasive. In DeMillo, the information failed plead facts to 
show the defendant'* absence from the St.ate anc • - *- consequent 
application of the California Penal Code section which would have 
tolled the statute of limitations. Utah has a similar statute, 
Utah Code Ann § 7 6 1 -304 (J 978) However, the tolling of the 
statute of limitations is not the issue In the present case; the 
issue is not whether specific facts (e.g., the absence of 
defendant from the state) caused an exception to, or tolled, the 
statute of limitations in the present case, there is a specific 
statute which governs the period of time within which a 
prosecution for frau il may be commenced. Utah Code Ann. § 76 1 
303 (Supp. 1987) is applicable in the present case and states 
that when an offense involves, inter alia, fi: and, the st .atute of 
limitations is seven years so long as the prosecution is 
commenced within one year of the discovery of the offense. 
in the instant casf\r unlike Demillo,, the information is 
not facially defective, and defendant was put on notice at that 
outset that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 (Supp. 1987) would be 
applicable. The very nature and ti tie of the chai ge, "presenting 
a false or fraudulent insurance claim/" notified defendant that a 
primary aspect of the crime is fraud. Consequently, defendant 
was informed the potent i a! applicati oi i of "Utah Code A nn. § 76-
1-303 (Supp. 1987), which would render the statute of limitations 
a potential seven years. 
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Further, if defendant had concerns about the 
sufficiency of the information, his exclusive remedy was to file 
a motion for bill of particulars as provided for in Utah R. Crim. 
P. 4(b) and (e). In State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a "defendant normally 
obtains the information necessary to satisfy the constitutional 
requirement of the right to adequate notice through the 
operations of a bill of particulars" (citations omitted). 
Failure to file a motion for bill of particulars precludes 
consideration of the adequacy of the information on appeal. Id. 
Because neither Utah case law nor the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require a defendant to plead specific facts to 
establish fraud, and because, in any event, the information in 
this case informed defendant of the allegation of fraud and 
thereby notified defendant of the applicable seven-year statute 
of limitations, defendant's contention is without merit. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN IS 
A QUESTION OF LAW TO BE DETERMINED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIS 
ISSUE. 
Defendant filed a motion in limine in which he 
requested dismissal of the case on the grounds that the statute 
of limitations had expired (R. 14). A pretrial hearing was held 
during which defendant called six witnesses in an attempt to show 
that the offense of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance 
claim had been -discovered" within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-303 (Supp. 1987) soon after the offense, or that more than 
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one year lapsed between discovery and the filing of the 
informati on , and that the per i od of ,1 imu tat I ons had rui 1. 
Following presentation of the evidence, the trial court denied 
the motion (R. 251 
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in 
ruling as a matter of law that the prosecution was commenced 
within statute of limitations. Although defense counsel 
expressed concern OVPJ whirh party bote the burden nf proof at 
the pretrial hearing |R, 14!)), the record does not reflect that 
defendant adequately preserved this issue for appeal by 
specifica. , /. - . i. s rulina on the basis 
that the issue was a question of fact to be determined by the 
jury. Consequently, defendant has waived appellate review on 
this issue. State v. McCardle, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Wilson, 608 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah 1980). 
In the event this Court reaches the merits ^f 
defendant's claim, it should find defendant's contention to be 
without merit. The statute of limitations in a criminal case is 
jurisdictional; if the statute of Iinutations has tun, the State 
is barred from commencing an action. State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz, 
App. 246, 492 P.2d 742 (Ariz. App. 1972). Because the issue is 
jurisdictional, th«« IBBHP ih a matte? of law that must bv 
determined by the trial court. See State v. Aquilar, 736 P.2d 
620 (Or. App. 1987). 
An, Bt.dteiJ in Point 1, thf; applicable statute ol 
limitations in this case provided that the action could be 
commenced within one year after discovery of the crime so long as 
-11 -
discovery and the commencement of the action were within seven 
years of the commission of the crime. On June 4, 1987, Russell 
Hunsaker reported the crime to Paul Johnson, the Orem City 
Attorney, during his deposition on an unrelated civil matter. 
Warren Booth also gave information about the crime on August 5, 
1987. (R. 32-34) The information was filed on November 19, 
1987, charging defendant with presenting a false or fraudulent 
insurance claim (R. 10). Thus, the information was filed within 
one year of the discovery of the crime and within seven years of 
the crime itself. 
Defendant alleges that a number of important factual 
questions exist which should have been determined by a jury. AB 
10-11. He contends that whether defendant was having financial 
difficulty, whether defendant had the insurance for only five 
days, whether the car was stripped in one place and then 
transported, and whether the fact that the police requested 
defendant to take a polygraph constituted discovery of the crime 
were facts that should have been decided by the jury. This is a 
baseless argument. Unlike State v. Wyman, 198 Kan. 666, 426 P.2d 
26 (1967) and State v. Ladely, 82 Wash.2d 172, 509 P.2d 658 
(1973), relied upon by defendant, there are no disputed facts in 
this case. The prosecution acknowledges that they were 
suspicious of defendant from the outset. However, mere suspicion 
does not constitute discovery which would invoke the running of 
the statute of limitations for fraud. 
It is apparent that none of defendant's "factual 
questions" goes beyond the realm of "suspicion." Suspicion is 
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defined in HI at k B Law Dictionary as ' '[t]he apprehensioi i of 
something without proof or upon slight evidence. Suspicion 
implies a belief or opinion based upon facts or circumstances 
which do not amount of proof " Black s I »aw Dictionary 129 8 ( 5th 
ed. 1979). This principle was reaffirmed in Turner v. Liner, 87 
P.2d 74 0, 742 (Cal. 1939), in which the California Supreme Court 
stated that di scover y " and " know 1 edge" are ' • i ver 111 1 e 
terms, and whether there has been a discovery • the facts 
constituting a fraud, within the meaning of the statute of 
limitations, is a question of law to be determined bv the court. 
In the present case, the determination of whether the 
statute of limitations had run was a question of law to be 
determined i: y the trial court. Even though the issue involved 
mixed questions of law and fact, the decision was a preliminary 
determination to be made by the court. See State v. Hawk, 589 
P.2d 113 6 (Or. App. 1979). This issue is analogous to an 
affirmative defense, such as a contention that evidence was 
seized illegally The trial court must deter mi ne based oi :t facts 
presented at a hearing on a motion to suppress whether, as a 
matter of law, the evidence should be suppressed. See State v. 
Hinton, 680 P.2d 74 9 (Utah 1984), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988). Simply because 
there are issues of witness credibility or sufficiency of the 
e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t c o n v e i: t a q u e s t i o n o £ I a w i n t o a q u e s t i • :> n o f 
fact for a jury determination. 
In the present case, because the trial court properly 
ru 1 ed that 11 ie statute of 1 i ini tat i o n B had not r un, defendant was 
-] 3-
not entitled to his requested jury instructions on this issue, as 
he contends. 
POINT III 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS NOT UNCONSTITUTION-
ALLY SHIFTED TO DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE. 
Although there is no Utah law on point on this issue, 
it appears that defendant's contention that the statute of 
limitations had run is similar to an affirmative defense. As a 
result, defendant must have come forward with some evidence, 
however slight, that the statute had run. 
However, at no time was the burden of proof 
unconstitutionally shifted to defendant in this case. In cases 
in which a defendant raises an affirmative defense, all he must 
do is show some evidence to raise a reasonable doubt. 
Nevertheless, the prosecution always bears the burden of proving 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Starks, 
627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981). 
In the present case, defendant presented evidence in an 
attempt to show that the statute of limitations had run because 
the State had "discovered" the offense well before Russell 
Hunsaker came forward with his statement to authorities in June 
of 1987. However, the witnesses testified that while they were 
suspicious of defendant and had even asked him to take a 
polygraph, their suspicions did not rise to the level of 
discovery of the crime. 
The evidence of defendant's guilt in this case was 
overwhelming. Five days prior to presenting his insurance claim, 
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defendant obtained a policy of insurance on his vehicle for at 
least $8,000 He enlisted ttif help" of his employee and friend, 
Russell Hunsaker (ae well as others) to take the stripped vehicle 
to Provo Canyon, remove the tires and wheels, and push the 
veh i c 1 e o i e :i a c .11 f f . N t > i o n I, y d i d R u s s e 11 H u n s a k e r t e s t i f j • a t 
trial to these events, Warren Booth did as well. The prosecution 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as the jury found, that 
defendant had committed the cr ime At i 10 time was the burden of 
proof impermissibly shifted to defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendai it Danny L. Pierce, was properly convicted of 
presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim within the 
applicable statute of limitations. For the foregoi ng reasons, 
the State requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this QJ day of December, 
1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to James P Rupper, 43 East 200 North, P 0. Box "L", Provo, Utah 
84603-0200 on this day of December, 1988. 
-15-
lm^ /wjwfu^ 
